I. INTRODUCTION The study of economic theory is unique. Often time economists find themselves searching across the text and thought of other sciences- math, philosophy, psychology, etc., for answers to economic questions. The consequence, whether or not by choice, many economists end up knowledgeable in many different fields of science. However, nowhere does the economist seem to benefit more than from the study of history. Economics is a social science, and its theories are derived from the actions of man-so what better laboratory exists than life itself? History provides the economist with observable data, instances, and outcomes that make economic theory testable. Not many better examples exist than the alcohol Prohibition era of 1917-1935. Here history has provided the economist with a definitive time and situation to study the effects of direct government intervention on the economy. Much has been done on this era, and much more will come. No other time gives the economist so much data and opportunity to study black markets, government/consumer behavior, and the countless other effects occurring under such a severe policy. And every study of the era is important- prohibitions still exist. Furthermore, the groups and their subsequent lobbies supporting such direct government intervention are growing every year against countless behaviors and products. The irony is most historians and economists agree alcohol Prohibition was a failure in its stated goal of curing Americans from alcohol addiction. Nor did it make America a "healthier more productive people." History makes it clear that Alcohol production never ceased, nor was effectively reduced. In fact crime and government corruption grew.[1] Additionally, many Americans came to resent someone else dictating their values and rights. Much the same has occurred with the 50+ year drug prohibition. Prohibition is the most severe of government economic interventions. History has proven its effectiveness questionable. Why then is such a costly policy still continually pursued? The answer is the cornerstone of economic behavior- self-interest. This paper will prove that Prohibition was enacted in order for political groups to capitalize on the benefits of serving pro- prohibition interest groups. Once the rewards were collected and the costs of serving these groups became to costly, policy was changed; hence, the repeal of Prohibition. It will be demonstrated that government was a self- motivated maximizer of revenue and/or votes. A brief look at the initiation and demise of Prohibition -plus the nationwide tax revolt occurring during the same period- relative to government interests, changing coalitions, ideologies, and state, local, and federal tax revenue data, will make the conclusions apparent. The conclusions derived are a synthesis of, and elaboration upon, several studies. A brief summary of the main sources, 1. David T. Beito, Taxpayers In Revolt, A study of the nationwide tax revolt from 1930-33, especially in Chicago. Beito concluded the revolt failed from lack of organization and ill-defined ideology.   2. Donald Boudreaux and A. C. Pritchard, "The Price Of Prohibition," Prohibition was made affordable by the income tax, and repealed due to a drop in income tax revenue. 3. Brian Goff and Gary Anderson, "The Political Economy of Prohibition in the United States", 1919- 1933.   Found senatorial votes for Prohibition and Repeal were motivated by other factors rather than voter's personal ideology.   4. Mark Thornton, "Prohibition: The Ultimate in Sin," Historical account of Prohibition ideology. The cycle of reform- prohibition-repeal, and the growth of government/ coalitions resultant thereof. Proposed the relationship between Repeal and the end of the tax revolt. The adoption of Prohibition; the occurrence of the Depression, tax revolt; the New Deal; and the repeal of Prohibition were interrelated. The adoption of Prohibition was an attempt by Government to collect votes and assets by aligning its interests with a well organized, large, affluent, and strictly defined ideological movement and coalition. The initiation of the Income tax made the government's potentially risky move economical. II. HISTORY: IDEOLOGY, RELIGION, SOCIAL REFORM, AND BUILDING THE PROHIBITION COALITION The ideological roots of the prohibition movement go back as far as America's Colonial period. Mark Thornton's paper traced the movement to "Heretical" Christians who maintained it man's duty to prepare and purify the world for Christ's Second Coming. Alcoholic spirits had no place in their proposed Utopia. Alcohol was associated with bad behavior and health. "Experts" such as Benjamin Rush, a doctor and signer of the Declaration of Independence, attempted validate the belief. These validations were not necessarily based on actual science. The protestants likewise reasoned alcohol was the key to controlling the unruly immigrant and lower classes. The view would become especially attractive to the colonial elite, who for years, until the American Revolution, were the only new worlders who could afford to drink, therefore making the drinking ritual a symbol of status.[2] Eventually the power of the movement began to be tapped and/ or strengthened by secular sources. The Republican Party began to build itself as the representers of these reformers. Coalitions began to form between women's suffrage, abolitionists, and prohibitionists. Vote trading was obvious. In 1895 the Anti- Saloon League was formed with over 30,000 churches and 60,000 agencies affiliated. By 1919 the League had over 300,000 members and a budget of over 2.5 million dollars. It openly stated that it would absolutely support any pro- prohibition official financially; and through its considerable media machine, into office.[3] The League published over 40 tons of propaganda a month. Much of the propaganda was slanderous towards Negroes and immigrants.[4] It also praised the potential rise in the productivity of the American worker from reduced alcohol consumption.[5] The latter reason was supported by a considerable amount of work on the subject by, and obvious reputation, of economist Irving Fisher. It gave the movement a more secular and scientific appeal. It was not long before the movement matured from a sect of Christianity into a full blown political machine complete with large monetary backing, membership, and plenty of crucial "expert" opinions. The union of Evangelicals and Scientific Progressives was the final step thus making the movement politically irresistible. Politicians were easily able to capitalize on its vote and money potential. It is easy to see that the lure of campaigning as a pro-Prohibition candidate was significant considering the instant platform and support. III. PROHIBITION BECOMES AFFORDABLE: REFORM TO THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT However, the problem of supporting the existing infrastructure of the American bureaucracy after election and actual passage of Prohibition had to be addressed. The liquor tax was American government's single largest revenue source until its replacement in 1918 by the income tax. Donald Boudreaux convincingly argued that the U.S. Government was very aware of its legislative and policy actions with respect to the substitution. The substitution financed Prohibition. Boudreaux wrote,   Income tax revenues accelerated most dramatically in 1918 (in terms of dollars raised), but the income tax had already demonstrated its prodigious revenue by 1917. The volume of 1917 receipts nearly tripled the 1916 level. More importantly, congress passed in October 1917- two months before it successfully proposed the eighteenth amendment- the legislation that would yield 1918's enormous increase in income tax receipts. Congress predicted with considerable accuracy the amount of income tax receipts generated by the War Revenue Act of 1917. Congress believed the Act would raise $2.5 billion annually; and, indeed, the Act raised more than $2.3 billion in 1918.[6]   The income tax officially came into existence in 1913. In 1917 the income tax's revenue potential was re-evaluated, its capabilities proved the liquor tax trivial, and Prohibition was enacted shortly thereafter. The pattern of events supported Boudreaux's hypothesis. Prohibition was ultimately passed because the income tax had made it affordable. Politicians were now able to fully capitalize on the Prohibition movement. In Boudreaux's own words,   ... ideology matters to self interested politicians when ideology matters to their constituents. Insofar as their constituents are willing to pay-in money or votes-for ideological legislation, politicians are willing to supply it. This approach recognizes that politicians protect their seats by seeking contributions and re-election votes in two conceptually distinct ways: (1) through taxation or regulation that redistributes wealth from politically ineffective groups to politically influential groups, or (2) through "social" legislation designed not so much to redistribute wealth, but, rather, to further ideological causes favored by well organized special interest groups. These two methods of securing votes are largely fungible; and indeed, in certain circumstances, may well complement one another. If an organized interest group opposes a particular activity on ideological grounds, politicians who reduce that activity (or the appearance of that activity) through taxation or regulation will win the political support of this interest group. At the same time, politicians gain the support of other interest groups who have no ideological qualms with the activity but whose economic interests are served by the tax or regulation. Where the two methods conflict, however, economic theory predicts that politicians will trade off one against the other to maximize re-election chances.[7]   Unfortunately for the government and prohibitioners, the income tax proved a failure. The Depression was not accounted for by Congressional forecasters, nor the nationwide tax revolt which also occurred. These two things combined to drastically reduce government revenue at all levels. And as might be expected, the government responded by maximizing revenue and votes. IV. PROHIBITION BECOMES COSTLY: PROHIBITION TO REPEAL Repeal would produce revenue for all levels of government through liquor taxes, liquor licensing, and state liquor monopolies. Furthermore, these "sin" taxes still raised prices and reduced output;[8] therefore somewhat appeasing the remaining Prohibition lobby. The taxes enabled Government to maximize revenue and minimize political damage. In 1933 government chose to trade Prohibition policy for Repeal thus gaining back significant tax revenue, and winning the support of the now formidable anti-Prohibition lobby. With Prohibition's failure of its stated goals, the pro-repeal lobby had grown at breakneck speed from a small number of liquor producers to a lobby including the American Federation of Labor, Association Against the Prohibition Amendment, and the Voluntary Committee of Lawyers. It ultimately found its way to the Democratic platform and helped achieve the overwhelming victory of Franklin Delanor Roosevelt and The New Deal. Boudreaux's thesis implied that government representatives at the time did not decide their actions based on personal beliefs of right or wrong; but rather, made decisions based on remaining in office and raising revenue for the bureaucracy. Brian Goff and Gary Anderson studied the question of personal ideologies in the Prohibition and Repeal votes. The authors built an econometric model that took into account different motivators for prohibition's passage and repeal. The model estimated the vote by each senator in 1917 and 1933. The following function was used, support/ opposition= f( constituent preferences, interest group activity, political party activity, legislator ideology)[9] The authors included economic motivations with the "interest group activity", and party interests with "political party activity." Anderson and Goff compared the data of senators who voted in both 1917 and 1933 to determine whether their personal ideology played a significant role. If so, the authors reasoned it should make a noticeable difference in the model's 1917 versus 1933 estimations. It did not. The authors concluded the senators' votes were motivated by other factors other than personal ideology. In light of Anderson and Goff's results, and tax revenue data from the period, it appeared Boudreaux's tax- substitution thesis undeniably correct . Tax revenue considerations and the country's ideological views must have been on the minds of politicians collecting paychecks and votes during the Jazz and Depression ages. However, one more additional factor must be added to the story of Repeal- that of the aforementioned tax revolt. Both Boudreaux and Anderson alluded to the economic self interests of some parties, mainly the high income classes, in respect to Repeal easing income tax burdens. Only Thornton considered Repeal as a direct reaction to tax revolt.[10]   V. REPEAL AND THE TAX REVOLT: A STUDY IN GOVERNMENT SELF-PRESERVATION AND REDISTRIBUTION Nineteen thirty-three was a "water shed" year in history. It brought the election of Roosevelt, Repeal, the New Deal; the end of a tax revolt, and the general restructuring of government finance at all levels. Beito's book Tax payers in Revolt, read with the other works presented in this paper, unraveled why 1933 occurred the way it did; and how desperately and discreetly "leviathan" behaved to end Prohibition and the tax revolt. Federal, State, and Local government managed to survive these years relatively unscathed and continued maximizing revenue and votes. With the hard times of the Depression, citizens began to question Government taxation policies. Some organizations such as The Federal Dispensary Tax Reduction League openly supported tax redistribution to ease the burden of the income tax. They supported Repeal to provide a substitute- the liquor tax. Other, more agitated, citizens began to deny the legitimacy and need for government services and the costs they incurred altogether. Beito found a statement in the Iowa Taxpayer declaring, "our local, state, and national government is passing from the stage of an agency to serve the people, to a huge bureaucracy whose chief aim is to enlarge itself." Beito further elaborated, "over and over again, municipal employees and civic reformers portrayed themselves as under siege." The Federation of State Leagues of Municipalities Published a report complaining,   It is generally accepted as an established fact that all public employees are extravagant bureaucrats, time serving payrollers and non-productive parasites whose mere existence is an unwarranted imposition on all long suffering taxpayers. It appears that all public officials therefore have forfeited their rights to be considered as human beings. They should be driven from the public trough and their salaries slashed ruthlessly.[11] Matters were made worse when the National Industrial Conference board reported real wages collected by public employees had increased significantly over those of the private sector- 11.5 percent between the years of 1929 to 1933. [12] The Government sector did not seem to be suffering the depression to the same degree as other citizens. The late 1920's also found state and local governments taking advantage of "tax anticipation warrants" (a bond payable in future taxes thus evading any legally mandated tax debt limit). The trading of tax titles (if a taxpayer did not meet his payment, his tax title could be sold, the buyer then could sue for the right to the delinquent's property) between government and the private sector had also grown into an effective and profitable market. Both tax title trading and tax- warrants were nationwide industries worth millions of dollars boasting their own professional organizations and publications. Private bankers felt the tax- warrants guaranteed, and the government thought them foolproof. A symbiotic relationship developed between bankers, government, and tax title traders. Taxes as a percentage measurement of national income doubled from 11.6 % in 1929 to 21.1% in 1933. This three year period increase was greater than that of the entire 20's decade.[13] In no coincidence, the tax revolt occurred and grew to its fullest height from 1930 to 1933. At the onset of the Depression and the tax revolt, American Government was strung out on debt from tax anticipation warrants, and to reliant on certain tax groups- just as bankers, tax title traders, and municipal bond brokers were to reliant on Government. It was estimated that between three and four thousand tax revolt organizations were in existence by 1932.[14] These organizations supported everything from legal limits on Government spending to outright tax strike. Tax delinquency in cities with populations over 50,000 more than doubled from 10.1% in 1930 to a record 26.3% in 1933. Delinquency varied from a rate of 68.6% in Shreveport, Louisiana to 2% in Providence Rhode Island, but was present everywhere in the nation.[15] Richard Olney, one time Democratic congressman, confessed his own delinquency at the 1934 National Tax Association saying, "I am one of a great Army, not of the unemployed, but, of tax delinquents."[16] The revolt was felt in all levels of government, but nowhere was it as apparent as the State and Local level. Here was where government and constituent came in closest contact, and government had made the mistake of over burdening a particular group-property owners. The minority began to realize its plight and reacted. It was property owners who were most visibly the originators and participants in the tax strike. People were refusing the payment of income tax to cut costs, but property owners were by far the most identifiable group. Property tax was the staple of state and local revenue. In the 1920's, the general property tax was responsible for 90% of taxes levied by cities over 30,000; by 1928 real estate owners were responsible for 93% of the tax- the State level found the general property tax providing 25% of the revenue, still a significant amount, with real estate owners responsible for 77% of the amount.[17] The revolt forced a unique situation. It found all levels of Leviathan, including those businessmen with vested interests in the tax sector, working together towards self preservation and the restoration of falling revenues. Repeal played a considerable role in the government's financial solution for abating the revolting class, and a government orchestrated propaganda campaign eliminated its ideological element. The government anti-striker campaign also made use of the threat of force. The famous Chicago tax strike was the quintessential example. VI. THE FORMATION AND ACTIONS OF A PRO-GOVERNMENT COALITION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: CHICAGO Chicago politics through the 20's and 30's was steeped in corruption and behind the scenes political dealings. As Beito states,   By the 1920's, Chicago's rival Republican and Democratic machines had farmed out most of the tax-fixing authority to precinct captains. Herbert Simpson [a Northwestern Economics professor who studied Chicago politics during this time period] recalled, 'one could sit in the Board of Review and Board of Assessor's offices and see these men come in with their pockets bulging with crumpled tax bills of constituents to be 'fixed'. The upshot was the assessments fluctuated wildly, both within and between precincts. [18] Assessments were made in accordance to who was favorable to what political party. The scam was broken up in 1928 by the Chicago Teacher's Federation (CTF), hoping to secure more tax revenue for the educational system; and the Joint Commission on Real Estate Valuation, whose members owned property in Chicago's prime business sector, or the Loop, and suspected their property over assessed. The two together forced the Board of Assessor's to publicly publish their assessments in accordance with a long ignored 1898 law. Much to the public's dismay, it was found assessments varied from 1 to 100% of the property's true resale value. The average deviation was 36.5% (uniformity defined as 35.9%).[19] The scam had been exposed, and the media took hold of it. One glaring example the Chicago Tribune printed was the assessment of Police Detective Michael Grady's house for $500. His next door neighbor's house was assessed at $2,450. A general reassessment was ordered despite the Board of Assessor's objections. However, Mayor "Big Bill" Thompson managed to hold up the reassessment until after his April primary. Chicagoans enjoyed a two year tax holiday from May 1928 to July 1930. The holiday combined with the Depression ruined the city's credit. City revenue was down. Local banks were no longer eager to fund tax-anticipation warrants. Tax title trading was coming to a halt. Therefore, the City set up the Citizen's Committee; which in turn set up a subcommittee lead by W.W.I Liberty Bond chairman Philip R. Clarke. The committee was charged with the issue of bonds to raise funds. More importantly, the Committee mandated citizens pay up three years of taxes in sixteen months. At the time, Chicago real estate owner's were paying 80% of the local tax bill. Real estate values had fallen 38% from 1928 to 1930. Likewise new building construction fell 86%, and foreclosures surged upward 457% from 1927 to 1931.[20] Already embattled real estate owners were placed into an impossible financial position by the new tax plan- they began to organize and revolt. The Association Of Real Estate Tax Payers formed on May 9, 1930 boasting a membership of 33 prominent real estate owners. The organization's official statement of intent was, "an organization with which all Illinois real estate tax payer's may become affiliated to permit united protection for themselves in matters of taxation and legislation, and to prevent an inequitable distribution of tax burdens on real estate and all incidentals thereto pertaining[21]." ARET argued that tax payers should only pay an amount of the local tax reflecting the amount of city services the payer received. It was clear that real estate owners were currently paying a disproportionate amount. The organization first tried to use the tax substitution method to ease their tax burden. The organization lobbied for an amendment re-instating the personal property tax (a tax on any type of property owned, tangible or intangible, by an individual). The tax had been dropped in the past because of the inability of government to collect. When the amendment was defeated, ARET immediately set another course of action. They proposed that the tax rate be set at 1% for real estate and 1% for personal property. ARET maintained a tax rate so low would ease the real estate owner's burden and encourage personal property to be declared. The Tax Commission held hearing to decide if another reassessment was needed. Due to the consequences of the two year holiday from the 1st reassessment, the Commission decided to reject ARET's proposal. After the decision made, the Commission's chairman, and several other members, resigned. Governor Louis L. Emmerson immediately took a vacation and escaped the responsibility of appointing a new Committee. ARET embarked on its final line of action. It hired the law firm of Watkins, Ten Hoor, and Gilbert under a two year contract to represent its interests, and began a large scale membership drive. Beito outlined the requirements for joining,   New members paid 1% of their tax bills, with a minimum fee of $2. No one tried to conceal the fact that ARET was now primarily a de facto legal defense service. Each membership form required a seperate legal fee of ten dollars (five dollars for taxes under $200) for each parcel of property owned by the taxpayer. It also stipulated that a new member must sign this agreement: ' I hereby make application for membership in your Association and authorize you to represent me through your attorneys Watkins, Ten Hoor, and Gilbert, in all court actions they deem necessary to protect my properties from tax sale or forfeiture, pending the decisions of the courts on the validity of the 1929[1930] assessment.[22] Membership grew to 30,000 by June 1932. ARET's first litigation concerned the unconstitutional refusal of Chicago's Board of Review to hear over 40,000 cases. ARET's executive director, John M. Pratt, publicly stated, "The action of the board in refusing to hear the objections is unconstitutional and illegal, and amounts to confiscation of Property without due process."[23] ARET advised its members to withhold the payment of 1929 taxes until the case decided. Chicago's Civic Federation answered by distributing pamphlets warning of possible seizure of delinquent's property and warning of general chaos for the community if government services were halted due to lack of funding. ARET's first litigation failed. ARET responded by taking nine different cases to court. Finally one case succeeded in the lower courts. The Judge ruled the Board of Review to hear 30,000 appeals from taxpayers. Chicago filed appeal. ARET continued to adise its membership withhold taxes. Possibly the greatest victory for ARET's interests, ironically, came from a case not represented by the organization. The case charged the assessor's office of under assessing personal property taxes. It was brought by Lillian Cesar and won in the county courts. Judge Edmund Jarecki ruled, "Can it be maintained that an assessment so flagrant, so reeking with fraud can be held to good roll?" The Judge's ruling also included that citizens should voluntarily pay the amount of tax deemed fair by the taxpayer. Government immediately appealed the decision to the Illinois Supreme Court. Meanwhile, payment of local taxes had become strictly voluntary. With the tax strike now legal and in full swing, Chicago's new mayor, Anton Cermak, was forced to cut the city budget 35.4%. He credited the tax strike. Now, the City and County Governments began to wage a full scale campaign against the strikers. Cermak first encouraged the local media to refuse ARET. All the major papers ran full page ads for pro-taxers and gave no space to ARET. The Chicago Evening Post and The Chicago Evening News regularly ran stories along these lines, "The danger of violence, fire, and diseases is so imminent as to warrant immediate preparation of possible invocation of martial law, under which civil rights in a normal community are automatically suspended"; and, "refusal to pay taxes strikes at the very root of government as effectively as an armed revolt."[24] The Post went so far as to say "Not to pay taxes in the hope that the court will give a reduction is to shirk the responsibilities and duties of citizenship."[25] WIBO and WCFL canceled Pratt's highly successful radio show. Pratt recouped by signing with WlS and WBBM. Radio, posters, and pamphlets were ARET's only media vehicles. The Government printed and distributed tons of posters and pamphlets with slogans such as "Take Your Trade Where The Taxes Are Paid"; "This Property Is Now Paying Taxes" (the government equated these posters with the Red Cross and Liberty Loan insignia displayed during W.W.I); "Pay Your Taxes"; and, finally, "Pay What You Think Is a Fair Tax! Pay Now! Keep Your Schools Open!." The last statement was a direct threat. Public school teachers were contemplating closing schools until revolters paid up. They eventually decided against it. As Beito stated,   [Teachers] began to wonder if such precipitate action could backfire against the teachers, rather than help them. At a mass meeting of the All-City Publicity Committee(an organization of teachers), a teacher named Mrs. Larkin was alarmed by one prospect in particular. She feared that closure might result in a massive and permanent switch of allegiance away >from the public schools. 'There are plenty of other schools in the city,' Larkin observed,' for all the children to go to if we do [close the schools] and they will go. . . There are private schools, there are Lutheran parochial schools and there are Catholic parochial schools. [26] Peter Foote, a member of ARET, actually approved of closing public schools. The closing of schools would significantly reduce government expenditures for the duration of the Depression. "Let them [school age children] learn to sew on buttons and other sensible things at home for a while," reasoned Foote.[27] Teachers reacted by placing "pay your taxes" cards in all the city's transportation vehicles. The All-City Publicity Committee also advertised a theme song entitled "Be Fair to Chicago's Boys and Girls! Pay Your Taxes Now!." Moreover The Committee proposed to the city a plan to declare 10,000 teachers as unofficial deputy collectors and use them for door to door collection. Mary L. Leitch, chairman of the committee, proclaimed tax collection was, ". . . a selling job. . . you must make it easy for the customer to buy. You must break down the sales resistance, and there is resistance to paying taxes. . . There is a mental complex we must look for."[28] The government agreed to allow the teachers to go door to door to deliver "pay your taxes" propaganda, but did not allow them to collect. The teachers even brought litigation against ARET claiming the organization held conspiracy and was corrupt. The courts absolved ARET of the accusations. It was ironic that the city's teachers, who at one time were directly responsible for exposing the cities fraudulent and corrupt assessment practices, now were fully aligned with the government in a propaganda campaign based on shame. The campaign accused non-payers guilty for lack of patriotism, neglect in the education of their children, and continually condemned strikers as "anarchist" criminals. City officials and public employees had formed a coalition based on a common interest- the dissolution of the strike and re-securing lost revenues. Beyond propaganda, the government used direct threats and acts of force to bring an end to the strike. The Chicago government passed into law a proposal that delinquents with bills exceeding $10,000 have their water shut off. Their privileges were revoked for switch tracks, driveways, electric signs, and the use of government property upon, under, and over streets and sidewalks. City officials threatened fines, the seizure of property, and revocation of strikers legal standing in court. 1932 found Cermak traveling to Washington to ask for a Federal subsidy. He pleaded, "Give us the money, and we will show up the tax slackers and the tax dodgers," then warned, ". . . money now or militia later."[29] With some persistence Cermak received the Federal Aid. The trip was a testimonial to how desperate Chicago officials had become. And the Federal government believed the situation grave enough to get involved. The massive campaign of propaganda and threats by "pay your taxers" to discredit and discourage ARET eventually began to take effect. Pratt's family was forced into hiding due to a kidnapping threat during the height of the campaign, but generally, tax revolters were not greatly discouraged. Most realized the government's campaign was mostly rhetoric. The beginning of the end came with the overturning of the Cesar case in the court of appeals. The decision was not based on justice, but the preservation of government. The rationale and implications behind The Supreme Court of Illinois' decision summarized by Beito,   This decision left the properties protected by the Jarecki ruling once again legally subject to sale and forfeiture. The court's opinion focused on the practicalities rather than the legalities of uniformity. It maintained that a ruling for strict uniformity could be used by an unscrupulous assessor anywhere in Illinois to prevent government, both local and state, from functioning. The ruling underscored a problem that dogged ARET no end. When forced to choose between literal enforcement of the uniformity article or protecting the power of government, the courts invariably opted for the power of government. [30]   ARET appealed the ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court refused hearing. In a separate case shortly thereafter, Jarecki, the same judge who decided the original Cesar ruling, ruled to dismiss all of ARET's objections and judged it proper to sale 56,000 properties belonging to "genuine strikers." Jarecki ordered a 50% reduction of penalties for those delinquents who came to court voluntarily and made partial payment. Jarecki confessed his fear, "tax crises have been at the bottom of every revolution. A tax crisis is synonymous with oppression and if our situation goes to far, I'm afraid this will happen."[31] ARET's less radical members began to wane without the legal protection of the earlier rulings. The banks, with their vested interests in the tax sector, made it easy for reluctant strikers to recommence payment. An arrangement with the government, much like that of Christmas Savings Clubs, was formulated. "Pay-Your-Taxes Savings-Clubs" allowed citizens to pay their taxes in fifty installments; and when full payment was received, the banks would refund the interest to the payer and give the principle to the government. Banks had a strong incentive to exercise such policy. Government debts accounted for over one third of annual tax collections. Those holding the debt ranked over the schools as the largest tax- dependent group in Chicago.[32] Banks joined the teachers in Chicago's "pay your taxes" coalition. The city government's campaign encouraged payment by using force and shame. The banks and courts enticed payment. Hayden Bell, the state's attorney, declared point blank, "Such citizens [tax revolters] stand willfully opposed to government. They would not have much legal standing in court. It would be natural for government to favor those who are not opposed to government."[33] These strategies combined made it easy for revolters to recommence payment, leaving little left but property seizure and prosecution for those who continued to resist. Understandably, the resistance movement began to subside. Nevertheless, Beito concluded that the ultimate demise of the tax strike and ARET was not resultant from outside pressure, but internal shortcomings. He opined that ARET was not organized enough ideologically or strategically to win a tax strike. The organization did not give supporters an alternative to a drastically reduced or even bankrupt government. Nor did it answer the accusations of anarchy. ARET was short sighted and negligent in its planning and platform. Most of all, Beito accredited its demise to an inward power struggle between two factions- one led by Pratt and James Bistor, the other by Jacob Kesner. Both fought over the control of the finances and future policy. Pratt wanted to continue the strike while Kesner wanted to reconcile and cease. A meeting was called of the ARET membership. The anti- Pratt forces claimed, if the meeting was held, bloodshed would occur. They further accused Pratt of "extravagance in the use of funds and of plotting to start a radical third party." The Chicago courts issued an injunction against Pratt's faction forbidding meetings, radio speeches, or access to ARET funds. Effectively ARET had finally been stopped. The Illinois Supreme Court provided the coup de grace by fining ARET for practicing law without a license. The city government subsequently passed the Skarda and Graham Acts to protect itself in the future. The first allowed any judge to appoint receivers for income producing tax-delinquent properties. The receivers were granted the power to take charge of such properties and allocate a portion of its assets towards tax payment. The latter act required taxpayers to pay at least 75% of their taxes before being legally allowed to place an objection in court. VII. THE REVOLT ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL: THE PRO- GOVERNMENT COALITION GROWS Chicago's plight was not overlooked by the nation. Other State, and Local Governments learned from the experience, as did bankers. Politicians were in a constant state of wariness from 1930 to '32. Several states passed legislation identical to the Skarda Act. Atlanta's school commissioner, Julia O'Keefe Nelson threatened the city school's bureaucrats the imminence of, "Chicago's plight" occurring in Atlanta, that, "[citizens] are forming plans to arouse every ward, parade the streets , picket the courthouse, and city hall, refuse to pay taxes!" In New York prospective revolters modeled their actions after those of Chicago. Sanders Shanks, editor of Bond Buyer, convinced the National Municipal League to launch a nationwide media campaign centered around the Chicago teacher's slogan "Pay Your Taxes!" Soon many of the nation's leading banks and bank associations such as Chase National Bank and the Investment Banker's Association of America joined. Thomas Reed was announced chairman of the campaign's organized body- the National Pay Your Taxes Campaign (NPYTC). Immediately thereafter, at the President's Conference on Crisis in Education, Reed managed to form the Citizen's Councils for Constructive Economy. He was named its director. The organization supported the idea off "constructive" government as opposed to "destructive" government. It was the difference between supporting governmental reform rather than "destructive" anti-government revolt. Civic reformers, bureaucrats, and bondholders were instantly supporters. Public Administrators' News praised it as a new trend amongst bankers and businessmen to abandon the slogan "REDUCE TAXES' in favor of the more constructive "PAY YOUR TAXES."[34] The CCCE defended the idea of reforming government services rather than reducing the amount of expenditures. For example, when defenders of reduction pointed out government taxes had risen twice as fast as national income since 1890, a CCCE pamphlet replied that the argument was, "largely beside the point," and, "is no proof for the assumption that governmental costs, if honestly and efficiently expended, ought not to increase in greater proportion than the population or national income."[35] Incidentally, the NYPT published both a Campaign Manual and Publicity Handbook outlining for politicians and interested parties how to build "pay your taxes" coalitions and conduct media campaigns conveying the attitude of "good" government. Reed expanded his crusade to the radio waves on the "You and Your Government" program. It ran from 1932 to 1936. It featured the support and appearances of municipal reformers, academics, and government employees. Over 270 guests were featured; 94 public officials, 97 academics, and 79 businessmen and professionals. The show ran immediately after Amos and Andy. It was blatantly biased pro-government- even to the point of fixed debates. An NBC executive complained, "practically all of these people live off tax money, why not give the 'guy' who pays a chance." Upon the network's consideration of moving the show to a less desirable time slot, the show's curators threatened retribution from their more than powerful friends. The Federal government assisted the national "pay your taxes" campaign through such groups as the Public Works Administration (PWA) and the Home Owner's Loan Corporation. The PWA used its legal division to help local governments evade tax limitation laws and therefore meet eligibility for government construction subsidies. Likewise the PWA's legal department actively assisted the Reed's "good" NPYT organization with advise and legal help. The HOLC provided low interest loans to benefactors in order to buy property and/or pay back taxes. The beneficiaries were required to pay the loan back over fifteen years at 5% interest. The HOLC lent $200 million to delinquents. Debt with the Federal government provided a strong incentive against revolt for HOLC loan benefactors. Lehman Brothers surveyed 106 city governments in 1935 asking what was responsible for the decline in tax revolt. A majority cited the HOLC.[36] VIII. REPEAL AND THE TAX REVOLT: THE PRO-GOVERNMENT COALITION SECURES REVENUE AND PACIFIES REVOLT Beito briefly alluded to another possible reason for the decline of the tax revolt. It was logical inasmuch as Federal, State, and Local governments were campaigning for "pay your taxes," that direct pacification of the most identifiable revolting class must have been considered. Therefore, any motivation for belligerence had to be removed; and, accordingly, the government made financial adjustments to ease the tax burden on the real estate owning class- the originators of the tax strike. Between 1933 and 1940 the property tax declined .9% in Chicago, but, despite the revolt, Chicago's total local tax load increased 15.4%, or 3.1% more than the national average for cities with populations over 100,000 .[37] Nationwide the percentage share of national income paid in state and local taxes fell from 16.6 in 1932 to 12.3 in1939. The reduction was cancelled out by increased Federal taxes. Taxes for State, Local, and Federal governments claimed 21.5% of national income in 1932.[38] Through the end of the decade federal taxes continued rise and local/state taxes actually doubled. Beito decided in lieu of such statistics, the tax revolt had failed. Upon examination of 1933 tax revenues, one can conclude government redistributed tax burdens. Repeal played a definite role in the redistribution. Once again Federal, State, and Local governments could charge sin taxes and licensing fees. They also capitalized on government liquor monopolies. The additional revenue brought to Chicago after Repeal was apparent. Repeal was undeniably a boon to all levels of government in recouping revenue lost due to the Depression and Tax Revolt. Sales tax also became a large State and Local revenue collector. These additional taxes in 1933 enabled all levels of government to effectively broaden the tax base and increase revenue without excessively burdening one particular group. "The conditions that gave rise to resistance were mitigated," said Beito. Government had circumvented the tax revolt. From Beito's account of the tax strike, It was evident that State, Local, and the Federal levels of government actively participated in coercion and propaganda to defeat the anti-government tax reduction and/or strike movement. A coalition existed among the three levels of government and interested parties. The behavior of local governments such as Chicago; the adoption of state laws directly aimed against the threat of revolt; the Federal subsidy of Chicago; the actions of Federal organizations such as the PWA and HOLC; and finally, the drive of the banker/ municipal bond holder CCE; all demonstrated the assemblage and strength of the pro- tax coalition. The organization and ideology of America's most famous local tax revolt group, Chicago's ARET, was not strong or defined enough to withstand the anti-revolt coalition on the local level; and with absolutely no national organization, only a loose affiliation of individuals and groups throughout the nation, neither did the revolt survive, even ideologically, nationwide. The revolt movement was successfully transformed into one of reform or apathy. IX. CONCLUSION: CYCLES, IDEOLOGY, COALITIONS, SELF-INTEREST, AND THE MONOPOLY OF FORCE Some interesting and controversial points have been presented in this study. It was evident a strong incentive definitely existed for Federal, State, and Local governments to vote for Repeal. Federal government was suffering from a failed income tax. State and Local government (the level of government most directly in contact with its constituents) was also losing revenue; and had to contend with, or were in fear of, a mounting tax revolt. The Federal government's involvement with the nationwide campaign against the revolt proved the urgency and scope of the problem to government. Reduced revenue and revolt were not part of Roosevelt's upcoming New Deal. Repeal was a viable solution. It raised government revenue, and "took the fire" from the revolt . 1933 saw the end of Prohibition and the beginning of a new era of government; the New Deal. In final remark, never did government accede to or entertain the thought of true reduction in taxes, and therefore size. It did not democratically act for, or legitimately discuss the arguments with, those people it represented called "tax strikers." Government deemed them criminals. Government did not react as hostile towards supporters of Prohibition or Repeal. These groups, respectively, were responsible for the Republicans election in 1917 and the Democrats in 1933. The difference between the government's reactions towards the groups has to do with their ideologies. Being self motivated, government chose to respond in 1917 and 1933 in such manner to enlarge its resources and importance. It capitalized on the Prohibition and Repeal movements. Yielding to its anti-government, pro- tax reduction constituency was unthinkable. No one chooses to fire themselves. And with the governments' monopoly of force, control of the courts, and impressive media capabilities- proven in this study- lessons in history do not necessarily matter in policy formation- only votes and revenue. The Drug war continues. New coalitions are constantly continuing to form. More groups are proposing restrictions on products and behaviors for moral and/or economic incentives. They can all be found on Capitol Hill vying for government favor. Until an ideology defined by personal freedom prevails in every soul, the cycle of reform, prohibition, and repeal will continue for as long as government does.